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Abstract: A large number of railway mega-projects are planned or are under 
implementation for capacity augmentation, for serving the needs of trade, specific 
regions or industry sectors. Since transport capacity is one of the main levers of 
economic progress, it is essential that augmentation of transport capacity is not held 
up. It is therefore essential to choose the appropriate project management structure, 
project financing, land acquisition and contractual process to ensure design, 
construction and commissioning of projects without cost and time overruns. These 
choices have to be made keeping in view the context of the organisational technical 
capacity, financial capability, contractor capacity, and industry and trade growth 
pattern. This paper examines the various project management structures, methods of 
project financing, land acquisition and contractual processes along with their 
advantages and disadvantages. The paper takes the specific case of the Dedicated 
Freight Corridor project to examine the appropriateness of options. 
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Introduction 
The Dedicated Freight Corridor (DFC) project of the Indian Railways (IR) has been 
conceived to create capacity and relieve congestion on the ‘golden quadrilateral’ or 
the high density network connecting the four metros, Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata and 
Chennai. (Secretariat for the Committee on Infrastructure, Planning Commission 
2005). Table 1 shows the network expansion of IR from 1950 to 2010. 
 
Table 1: Network expansion of Indian Railways 1950–2010 
Year Track-km (thousand) Freight traffic 
(billion ton-km) 
Passenger traffic (billion 
passenger-km) 
1950–51 59 38 67 
2010–11 114 636 978 
Source: Saxena 1991; Indian Railways 2012 
 
The golden quadrilateral, though constituting only 16% of the network, carries more 
than 55% of the freight traffic. (Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Ltd 
2012). It also carries a major part of IR’s passenger traffic, resulting in low average 
speeds of freight trains. Since freight and passenger trains on IR share the same 
tracks, the speed differential between the two further impacts the capacity. The DFC 
would enable segregation of freight and passenger traffic (Ministry of Railways 
(Railway Board) 2009). 
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The increase in the IR’s network capacity through doubling, gauge conversion, 
electrification, traffic facility improvement works, etc has not kept pace with the 
freight transportation demands of the Indian economy, which has been on a high 
growth path (Table 2). Freight traffic has therefore gradually shifted to road. Modal 
share of railways in freight transport has decreased from 50% in the 1960s to 36% in 
2007–08 (RITES Ltd 2008), in contrast to about 46% in China and the United States 
(McKinsey and Company 2010). A situation has arisen wherein road and rail 
infrastructure deficiencies have become one of the major deterrents of India’s 
competitive position in terms of manufacturing and trade. India today ranks 56th in 
the world Logistics Performance Index infrastructure rankings (World Bank 2012). 
 
Table 2: Growth of Indian Economy 1950–2010 
Year GDP at current 
prices (Rs. 
billion) 
Coal production 
(million tonnes) 
Steel production 
(million tonnes) 
Cement 
production 
(million tonnes) 
Foodgrains 
(million tonnes) 
1950–51 97 32 1 3 51 
2010–11 71,574 571 76 216 242 
Source: Planning Commission 2012 
 
It is desirable to increase rail share in national freight transportation from the 
economic and logistic costs perspectives, since rail transport is more energy efficient, 
environmentally and socially sustainable and less resource intensive compared with 
road. Increased investment is thus required in railway infrastructure to create capacity 
and thereby increase the rail share in freight traffic. In view of the above, the 
Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Ltd (DFCCIL) was formed as a 
wholly owned company of IR: 
 
to build a corridor with appropriate technology that enables Indian railways to regain its 
market share of freight transport by creating additional capacity and guaranteeing efficient, 
reliable, safe and cheaper options for mobility to its customers (Dedicated Freight Corridor 
Corporation of India Ltd 2012). 
 
The DFCCIL has been charged with the responsibility of construction and operation 
of the Western and Eastern DFCs, details of which are given in Table 3. The DFCs 
have been designed as heavy haul corridors. Heavier, longer and faster freight trains 
will operate on the DFCs, with lower unit costs of operations and maintenance, rolling 
stock, manpower and energy. Bulk trains (6000/12000 ton) and double-stack 
container trains (4500 ton) at 25 ton axle load will run on Eastern and Western DFCs, 
respectively. Infrastructure has been designed such that it can be upgraded to 32.5 ton 
axle load in the future. The track, bridge, electrification and signalling infrastructure 
are being designed and constructed to operate the DFCs as heavy haul networks with 
maximum speeds of 100 kmph and average speeds of 65 kmph. 
 
Modern high horsepower locomotives and high capacity wagons are also being 
concurrently developed for moving traffic on the corridors. In order to enable 
seamless movement of traffic between the DFC network and the existing IR network, 
feeder routes on the existing IR network are also been upgraded; the feeder route 
lengths for the Western and Eastern DFCs are given in Table 3. The Western DFC 
will complement the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) initiative, which is a 
Japanese-Indian collaborative project for comprehensive infrastructure development 
to create India’s largest industrial belt zone by linking the industrial parks and 
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harbours of the six states between Delhi and Mumbai to promote foreign export and 
direct investment. Under the DMIC initiative, industrial parks and logistics bases will 
be created in the area 150 km to either side of the Western DFC. The DFCs are 
conceived as corridors complementing the IR network. DFCCIL will create and 
maintain infrastructure, which would be utilised by IR to operate its trains. IR feeder 
routes will bring traffic from originating terminals and transferred to DFCs at 
junctions for destination terminals, and vice versa. 
 
Table 3. Salient features of DFCs1 
Feature Western DFC Eastern DFC 
Route length (km) 1534 1839 
Route JNPT-Dadri Dankuni-Ludhiana 
Feeder Route length (km) 1516 3071 
Projected traffic in million tonnes 
(2021) 
128 144 
Land Acquisition required 6587 hectares 4592 hectares 
Project cost (Rs.billion) 406 161 
Funding Agency Japan International Cooperation 
Agency 
World Bank 
Loan component (%) 80 67 
Number of Field Project Units 7 6 
Project Completion Target 2017 2016 
Source: Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Ltd 2012 
 
A large number of similar railway mega-projects are being planned or are under 
implementation for capacity augmentation or serving needs of trade, specific regions 
or industry sectors. Since transport capacity is one of the main levers of economic 
progress, it is essential that augmentation of transport capacity is not held up. It is 
therefore essential to choose the appropriate project management structure, project 
financing, land acquisition and contractual processes to ensure design, construction 
and commissioning of projects without cost and time overruns. These choices have to 
be made keeping in view the context of the region’s socioeconomic conditions, 
organisational technical capacity, financial capability, contractor capacity and 
industry and trade growth patterns. This paper examines the various project 
management structures, methods of project financing, land acquisition and contractual 
processes along with their impact on time and cost overruns. The paper takes the 
specific case of the Eastern Dedicated Freight Corridor Project to examine the 
appropriateness of the options (Figure 1). 
                                                       
1 JNPT is the abbreviation for Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust, which is also known as Nhava Sheva port 
and is located on the mainland across the island-city of Mumbai. It is the largest container port of India. 
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                             Western DFC                       Eastern DFC 
Figure 1: Map of Eastern and Western DFC 
Source: Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Ltd 2012 
 
Project execution in the railway sector is universally acknowledged to be very 
challenging. The myriad challenges include topographical, geological, hydrological, 
ecological, climatic and attendant technical challenges, assimilation of diverse 
components forming complex railway systems, social and environmental impacts and 
their appropriate mitigation measures, stakeholders’ management and legal/regulatory 
compliance issues. However, IR has been expanding and periodically replacing its 
assets (eg, replacing wooden with concrete sleepers, upgrading speed potentials of its 
133,000 odd bridges, replacement of track with long welded rails, optical fibre 
communication systems for train communication, doubling of single lines, unifying 
the gauge, etc) through project management. Table 1 gives an indication of the 
expansion of the IR network, while Table 4 shows the extent of project activities in IR 
for gauge conversion, doubling of lines and electrification. Besides this, IR’s 
engineers have been actively involved in building metro systems (eg, 410 km 
underground metro system in Delhi) and the challenging mountain railways (eg, 738 
km Mumbai-Mangalore Konkan railways and the 345 km Jammu-Udhampur-
Srinagar-Baramulla Railway Link, JUSBRL). 
 
Table 42 
Year BG as % of total network 
route km 
Double line as % of total 
network route km 
Electrified line as % of 
total network route km 
1950–51 46 9 0.7 
2010–11 86 30 30 
Source: Indian Railways 2012; Saxena 1991; Ministry of Railways, Government of India 1952 
 
However, as in other Indian infrastructure sectors, IR’s projects also suffer from cost 
and time overruns. The major reasons are the inadequacy of funds allotted for the 
projects, problems of acquisition of land required for the project and security 
problems in the project area. Other reasons for time overruns are lack of supporting 
infrastructure facilities, delay in finalisation of detailed engineering plans, scope 
                                                       
2 BG is the abbreviation for broad gauge track with gauge of 1676 mm. The other track gauges 
prevalent on IR are meter gauge (MG, 1000 mm) and narrow gauge (NG, 762 and 610 mm). The gauge 
conversions from NG and MG to BG were undertaken in early 1990s as Project Unigauge. 
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changes, delays in scope finalisation, unanticipated geological conditions and lack of 
familiarity with latest technology. Other reasons for cost overruns are time overruns, 
changes in foreign exchange rates and statutory duties, increase in cost of 
rehabilitation of displaced persons and providing environmental safeguards, increase 
in cost of land acquisition and inflation over project duration. (Ministry of Statistics 
and Programme Implementation (Infrastructure & Project Monitoring Division), 
Government of India 2008). 
 
Doloi et al’s (2012) study of delays of Indian construction projects identified the 
following seven critical factors in descending order of importance: 
i) lack of commitment by client, contractor and vendors leading to accidents, 
improper or obsolete construction methods, delay in material delivery 
ii) inefficient site management due to ambiguous specifications, unskilled 
labour, ineffective supervision, inadequate experience of contractor, lack 
of control over sub-contractors 
iii) poor site coordination due to lack of coordination between site and design 
office, non-availability of drawings/designs on time, unrealistic time 
schedule built in the contract 
iv) improper planning in ignoring extreme weather conditions which lead to 
low labour productivity and therefore lead to errors in time estimation; 
improper planning for recruitment of skilled operators for specialised 
equipment; improper planning for the requirement of equipment and their 
utilisation 
v) lack of clarity of project scope resulting in rework or scope creep due to 
misunderstanding by the contractor or project manager 
vi) lack of communication with local authorities resulting in delays in 
permissions; lack of communication between contractor and client results 
in delay in approval of stages substandard contract, selection of contractor 
with inadequate experience or skill sets, optimistic cost and time duration 
built in the contract 
 
We examine the Eastern DFC project to determine the measures taken to mitigate the 
major reasons for the time and cost overruns listed above. 
 
There is no research available on the measures taken to improve the success rate of 
public sector or IR projects in India. This paper attempts to fill this gap, since it is 
worthwhile analysing the evolution of mechanisms for project success in an 
organisation in existence in a developing country since 1853. The research is based on 
an examination of IR’s process manuals and annual reports of the DFCCIL, IR, World 
Bank’s project documents of the Eastern DFC along with discussions with senior 
management personnel. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the 
project structure of DFCCIL; the DFC project financing process; DFC’s land 
acquisition process; project contracting process; the impact of the project structure, 
financing, land acquisition and contracting processes on mitigating time and cost 
overruns; and concluding with future research directions. 
 
Project structure 
The IR network is carved into 17 geographical zones for administrative convenience. 
Each zone is again divided into divisions; IR today has 68 divisions. IR has a matrix 
form of organisation at three levels. The levels, in descending order of hierarchy are 
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the Railway Board, zones and divisions. While each level is organised on functional 
departmental lines, functional heads at each level report to both the top manager at 
that level as well as the functional head at the next level. IR uses two types of project 
organisations for execution of its projects. 
 
The first type is the zonal project organisation. These zonal project organisations have 
a strong matrix structure, with the project organisation chief reporting to the zonal 
head. The project personnel report to the project organisation chief, while taking 
technical directions and resources from the respective functional organisations of the 
zone. The project personnel are generally drawn from the respective zones. Since the 
project team are well versed with the zonal railway network and its operational 
constraints, and the projects also involve interfacing with the existing running system, 
they are able to integrate well with the operations organisation for effective project 
execution. 
 
The second type of project organisation involves reporting directly to the Railway 
Board. These organisations handle large-scale projects or projects involving work 
across geographical zones. Examples of such project structures are the Kolkata Metro, 
the Central Organization for Railway Electrification and the construction organisation 
for expansion of railway infrastructure in difficult terrains in the north-eastern parts of 
India. These organisations also have a matrix structure. Their personnel are, however, 
are drawn from across zones. 
 
In the 1990s, IR started the process of creation of wholly or partially owned public 
sector corporations (PSCs) for project execution and operation. Typical examples are 
the Konkan Railway Corporation (KRC), Rail Vikas Nigam Ltd (RVNL) and 
DFCCIL. The creation of these PSCs was due to a few major reasons: 
• The governance of these PSCs is independent of IR. The PSCs’ relationship 
with IR are governed by a negotiated Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
according to guidelines laid down by the Department of Public Enterprises 
(DPE) (Department of Public Enterprises (Ministry of Heavy Industries and 
Public Enterprise) 2007) The PSCs have operational autonomy, while being 
evaluated at periodic intervals on certain previously agreed performance 
measures by IR. 
• The PSCs can frame their own policies regarding human resource recruitment, 
training, promotion and transfers. 
• The PSC personnel are not subject to being transferred out of the PSC before 
completion of their tenure with the PSC. This enables creation and retention of 
experienced manpower for project management, and enables the PSC to take 
up projects in other areas; for example, KRC is executing part of the JUSBRL 
project. 
• The accounts of these PSCs are maintained independent of IR’s system. This 
allows monitoring and control of these organisations, especially in situations 
where they receive funds from sources other than IR. PSCs have higher 
autonomy and financial powers in respect to capital expenditure, joint ventures 
and strategic alliances 
• These PSCs have the freedom to modify procurement policies in line with 
lending agency requirements. 
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All the 16 PSCs were manned by IR personnel in the initial stages, with freedom 
given to the IR personnel to leave the PSC and return to IR. However, since the PSCs 
lose experienced project personnel as well as knowledge gained during the project, 
PSCs encourage the personnel to remain in the PSC permanently. DFCCIL has also 
been recruiting from the open market, in addition to IR personnel presently in the 
organisation. 
 
DFCCIL was created as a PSC under administrative control of IR, based on the 
performance of PSCs in project execution and operation. It has been registered under 
the Companies Act, 1956. The IR chairman is also the chairman of the DFCCIL board 
of directors. The DFCCIL board comprises the chairman, managing director, four 
full-time directors — for finance, infrastructure, project planning and operations & 
business development; two part-time official directors and two part-time non-official 
independent directors. During the construction phase, the overall staff strength of 
DFCCIL would be 930, with 30 staff in each field office. Current staff strength is 
around 350, of which 140 are on deputation from IR. Officers on deputation from IR 
are experienced in the project management systems, standards and practices of IR. An 
MOU is drawn up annually between DFCCIL and IR in accordance with guidelines 
issued by the DPE. Construction targets and milestones are defined in the MOU. 
Progress of DFCCIL is appraised in respect to targets set in the MOU. There will also 
be suitable incentive/penalty scheme based on key performance indices. 
 
Construction of the Eastern DFC is headed by the director project planning (DPP) and 
that of Western DFC by the director infrastructure located at DFCCIL headquarters, 
working through its field units. Each field unit is headed by a chief project manager 
(CPM). DFCCIL has also adopted the matrix structure with personnel reporting to the 
CPM and their functional heads at headquarters. The advantages that are accrued from 
matrix structures are evident from various studies (Larson & Gobeli 1989; Chuah, 
Tummala & Nkasu 1995). 
 
Project financing 
IR projects are generally financed by Budgetary Support and internal resources. 
However, IR has resorted to financing from external agencies in the case of very large 
projects. KRC was the first built–operate–transfer (BOT) project constructed with 
equity participation of IR and the state governments of Karnataka, Kerala, Goa and 
Maharashtra. This was followed by the joint venture Pipavav Railway Corporation 
Limited (PRCL) between IR and Gujarat Pipavav Port Limited, with equal equity 
participation. PRCL has concessionaire rights to construct, operate and maintain the 
Surendranagar-Rajula-Pipavav Port project line for 33 years. RVNL uses project-
specific equity routes and BOT route for project implementation. 
 
The DFC project requires large resources which obviously cannot be financed only 
through IR’s resources. This project is therefore being funded through a mix of 
bilateral and multilateral debt, equity and private investment. The debt–equity ratio of 
the project is 2:1. While the equity component of DFCCIL is being provided by IR, 
the debt component is being arranged by the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and the World Bank. The debt component comprises soft loans with long 
repayment periods of 25 to 40 years and a grace period of 7 to 10 years. Apart from 
the soft finance, the professional expertise of JICA and World Bank in project 
management will strengthen DFC project planning and implementation. 
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Other recent debt-financed projects of IR include the Rail Sector Improvement Project 
financed by Asian Development Bank, Delhi-Kanpur Signalling Project financed by 
Germany and Mumbai Urban Transport Project financed by the World Bank. 
According to popular practice, all such loans are received by the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) of the Government of India, acting as borrower. MOF passes on the loans to 
IR as part of Gross Budgetary Support (GBS). IR further passes on these loans to the 
PSC as equity. 
 
The major features of DFC project funding are as follows: 
• JICA loan for construction of Western DFC is estimated at 677 billion Yen. 
The remaining cost of Western DFC will be borne by IR as equity funding to 
DFCCIL. The JICA loan is being provided in phases: the first phase for the 
930 km Vadodara-Rewari section; the second phase for the 568 km JNPT-
Vadodara section. JICA’s loan flows to IR through MOF as part of GBS. 
• World Bank-IBRD funding is proposed at USD 2.7 billion for construction of 
the 1188 km Ludhiana-Mughalsarai section of the Eastern DFC. World Bank 
loan is structured through Adaptable Programme Loan (APL) scheme for 
sequential funding of the sections based on a trigger system which takes into 
account progress of previous sections with regard to land acquisition, civil 
contract award etc. For this purpose the 1188 km Ludhiana-Mughalsarai 
section has been divided into three sections: the first section being funded is 
the 343 km Khurja-Kanpur section (APL-1), followed by the Kanpur-
Mughalsarai section (APL-2) and Ludhiana-Khurja section (APL-3). The 
World Bank loan flows directly to IR and then to DFCCIL on a back-to-back 
basis. 
• The 122 km Mughalsarai-Sonnagar section of Eastern DFC is being funded by 
IR’s internal resources. 
• The 524 km Sonnagar-Dankuni section of Eastern DFC will be funded by a 
public-private partnership. 
 
IR will pay DFCCIL track access charges for use of DFC tracks by IR’s freight trains. 
Track access charge will have a fixed component covering all the fixed charges 
including debt repayment, and variable costs will cover operation and maintenance 
expenses. 
 
Land acquisition process 
Land acquisition for DFC involves over 11,179 hectares spread over 49 districts in 
seven states. Given the high population density of India, land acquisition for 
infrastructure projects is quite difficult. Keeping in view the enormity of the task, IR 
enacted a legislation for land acquisition under the Railways Amendment Act (RAA) 
in 2008 to provide a better framework for compensation and timeline than the existing 
Land Acquisition Act 1894. 
 
IR has also adopted the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy 2007 to 
provide resettlement and rehabilitation (R&R) assistance to Project Affected Parties 
(PAPs) on DFC. IR has formulated an Entitlement Matrix for providing land 
acquisition compensation at replacement cost and adequate R&R benefits to the 
relevant categories of the affected families, in consultation with JICA and World 
Bank. The Entitlement Matrix has also incorporated the feedback received project-
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wide Public Consultation Meetings held with the PAPs by CPMs of DFCCIL. The 
land acquisition process is being carried out with the support from Land Acquisition 
Consultants, who undertake land surveys and coordinate with the local revenue 
departments. DFCCIL is also hiring non-government organisations to assist in 
community participation, livelihood and skill improvement activities and to support 
affected persons in articulating their grievances. 
 
IR/DFCCIL has developed a well-defined institutional procedure for handling 
grievances and complaints relating to land acquisition. The authority appointed for 
carrying out land acquisition as per the RAA will be the first level for hearing and 
resolving objections relating to the land acquisition process. Independent arbitrators 
will hear and redress grievances relating to compensation awards according to the 
RAA. A two-stage grievance redress mechanism has been set out at the field and 
corporate levels. IR has also appointed an Ombudsman to deal with unresolved 
grievances related to R&R assistance. IR would also engage a Social and 
Environment Safeguards Monitoring and Review Consultant for third party 
monitoring and annual quality audit of the implementation of land acquisition and 
R&R measures (World Bank 2011). 
 
DFCCIL has also established a Social and Environment Management Unit (SEMU) 
for overseeing management of environmental and social safeguard measures. The 
SEMU includes experienced environmental management and social development 
specialists. At the field level, the CPM coordinates the safeguard management 
activities. 
 
The above steps have resulted in successful acquisition of over two-thirds of the land 
requirement so far. This is a significant achievement in project preparation, 
considering that the civil contracts of both World Bank and JICA-funded portions are 
still to be awarded. Acquisition of over 80% land is targeted before award of the 
contracts. 
 
Project procurement process 
IR construction procurement is based on traditional item-rate contracts where the 
responsibility of design is with the employer. Studies reveal that such contracts are 
prone to time delays and cost overruns. 
 
A cardinal principle for successful project execution is comprehensive risk mapping, 
with risks being allocated in such a manner that the party most appropriate to assess 
probability of occurrence of a particular risk and capable of initiating suitable 
mitigation measures bears that particular risk. A modified contract type, Design-Build 
Lump Sum (DBLS) contracting strategy has been adopted for DFC projects in line 
with this principle. Here, the project owner carries out preliminary site surveys and 
concept design whereas the contractor performs detailed engineering design and 
surveys, appropriate to the contract time and cost. This type of contracting strategy is 
most appropriate in situations with low uncertainty of product and high uncertainty of 
the process of delivery (Turner & Simister 2001). DBLS-type contracts effectively 
transfer the design risk from the owner to the contractor. The contract has an in-built 
incentive component for the contractor to ensure the accuracy of surveys and the 
quality of design (World Bank 2011). 
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Further, DFCCIL has adopted the FIDIC Yellow Book (Federation Internationale des 
Ingenieurs-Conseils (FIDIC) 1999), with certain modifications listed below, for all its 
contracts, instead of IR’s General Conditions of Contract (Engineering Department, 
Indian Railways 2010) to transfer some risks from employer to contractor to achieve 
higher certainty of cost and time: 
i. Clause 1.9 – Errors in Employer’s requirements 
ii. Clause 4.7 – Errors in setting out 
iii. Clause 4.10 – interpretation of site data 
iv. Clause 4.12 – unforeseeable physical conditions 
v. Clause 8.3 – Programme – Deletion of variation on account of future events or 
circumstances 
vi. Clause 8.4 – Extension of time for completion on account of adverse climatic 
conditions 
 
The implications of adoption of FIDIC Yellow Book vis-à-vis IR General Conditions 
of Contract is given in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: FIDIC Yellow Book vis-à-vis IR General Conditions of Contract 
No. Railway  general contract conditions FIDIC Yellow Book conditions 
1 Design responsibility with Employer 1. Only indicative design given by 
Employer to Contractor. Contractor is 
responsible for developing all design — 
Preliminary Design, Definitive Design 
and “Good for Construction 
Drawings”.  
2 Work is done and measured in terms of quantities 
for separate items. Payment as per Bill of 
Quantities. The quantity estimation risk is with the 
employer. 
2.Works is done and payment made on 
Design Build Lumpsum basis. Quantity 
estimation risk transferred to Contractor 
substantially.  
3 Contract Administration by Employer 3. Contract Administration by 
ENGINEER on behalf of  Employer  
4 Low price certainty 4. High price certainty 
 
Further, DFCCIL is being supported by the following experts in its procurement 
activities: 
• A “General Consultant(GC)/Engineering Services Consultant (EC)” appointed 
for each section of DFC to prepare the scope and the engineering plans before 
bidding and for rendering technical advice in the design of the project 
• A “Project Management Consultant (PMC)” being appointed for supervision 
of construction work relating to contract management, construction 
supervision, monitoring time schedule, checking and approval of designs and 
drawings, quality checking, ensuring work site safety preparation of operation 
& maintenance manuals for various components of works. The PMC will also 
perform the function of “Engineer” as required under FIDIC contracts. 
• A “Design Review Consultant” appointed to review preliminary designs 
against international good practices, as well as to conduct value engineering. 
• A “Civil Engineering Proof Consultant” appointed to verify the accuracy of 
surveys, quantities, material sources and cost estimates for civil and track 
works on a sample basis. 
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• A “Legal Advisor” appointed is to provide advisory on the preparation of bid 
documents, assistance during the bidding process and also to coordinate 
contract management activities once the main contracts have been awarded. 
• A “Quality and Safety Audit Consultant” to be appointed to assist DFCCIL to 
monitor construction quality, and the implementation of safety plans during 
project implementation. 
 
Discussion 
A large number of stakeholders are involved in the DFC project implementation. 
They include the IR, zonal railways, Planning Commission, MOF, Ministry of 
External Affairs, DFCCIL, lending agencies (JICA and World Bank), nine state 
governments (Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Rajasthan, 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Delhi), land owners and project affected parties, contractors, 
material suppliers and consultants. The relationship between these stakeholders is 
depicted in Figure 2. Effective coordination among these stakeholders is being 
facilitated by a cell in Ministry of Railways to expeditiously resolve financial, 
environmental, social, land compensation, resettlement, engineering, contractual, 
legal and organisational issues that are critical for successful completion of the 
project. 
 
 
Figure 2: DFC stakeholder relationships. 
 
It may be recalled that the major reason for time and cost overruns of IR projects has 
been the inadequacy of funds being allotted for projects. Tying up loans to the extent 
of about 70% of the project cost with JICA and the World Bank addresses the issue of 
inadequacy of funds for the DFC project. We examine the other major reasons of time 
and cost overruns (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation 
(Infrastructure & Project Monitoring Division), Government of India 2008) and the 
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role of these stakeholders, the project structure, the project land acquisition processes, 
financing and contractual process in mitigating overruns in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Common reasons for time and cost overruns and their mitigation measures 
No. Reasons for Time/Cost Overruns Mitigation Measures 
(i) Lack of supporting infrastructure 
facilities 
All the supporting infrastructure has been built into 
contractor’s scope of work. This supporting 
infrastructure includes service roads, all temporary 
works required to facilitate construction, site office, 
communication, inspection and transport facilities, 
provision of power and water etc 
(ii) Delay in finalisation of detailed 
engineering plans and release of 
drawings 
• General Consultants/Engineering Services 
Consultants have been engaged for each section of 
DFC to prepare the scope and the conceptual 
engineering plans before bidding. 
• Geotechnical, hydrological, seismic and 
environmental surveys carried out before 
commencement of bidding 
• Elaborate design procedures, criteria, 
specifications and processes with clear 
responsibilities outlined in bid document. 
• Project Management Consultant appointed for 
supervision of construction work 
• Interfaces and obligations of contractors to other 
contractors defined in bid document 
• Preparatory works such as environmental impact 
assessment, social impact assessment, public 
consultations, resettlement and rehabilitation 
undertaken before biding 
• 80% of land acquisition is required to be 
completed before award  of contract 
(iii) Changes in scope or delay in finalisation 
of the scope 
(iv) Industrial relations and law and order 
problems 
• Safety, Health and Environment manual drawn up 
by owner, incorporating best practices laid down 
in relevant legal provisions and appropriate for 
execution of projects with such complexity, to 
guide contractors’ efforts towards maintaining 
industrial relations and law and order. Suitable 
rewards and penalties in this regard defined in bid 
document. 
• social impact assessment carried out in advance, 
which enables deployment of counter-measures in 
advance 
• process of stakeholder consultation incorporated 
in project planning and execution process 
• regular coordination is maintained with state 
governments on security issues 
(v) lack of familiarity with latest technology  • General Consultants engaged to prepare 
specification, design and bid documents in line 
with international best practices 
• Comprehensive evaluation of bidders’ Technical 
Proposals to assess their familiarity with 
technology appropriate for the work 
• Interfaces defined 
• PMC will be reviewing construction methodology 
at critical stages to ensure that project construction 
methodology employs technologies appropriate 
within the time and budget constraints  
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(vi) Unanticipated geological conditions DFCCIL has undertaken preliminary geotechnical, 
hydrological, seismic, environmental surreys and 
included these in the bid documents wherever 
appropriate, with instructions to bidders to satisfy 
themselves with the accuracy of surveys provided and 
to undertake their own surveys before submitting their 
bids and to carry out detailed surveys and remedial 
works, if any, during contract execution. 
(vii) Changes in rates of foreign exchange 
and statutory duties 
Foreign currency denominated loan, close coordination 
maintained with Ministry of Finance regarding 
statutory duties 
(viii) increase in cost of rehabilitation of 
displaced persons and providing 
environmental safeguards  
Environment & Social Impact Analysis completed in 
advance; hence cost included in project cost estimate. 
(ix) increase in cost of land acquisition  Land acquisition cost is now statutorily defined and 
built in the project cost estimate 
(x) inflation over project duration  Inflation based on WPI is built in the project cost 
estimate 
(xi) lack of commitment by client, contractor 
and vendors leading to accidents, 
improper or obsolete construction 
methods, delay in material delivery 
As discussed in (iv) above, DFCCIL has developed a 
Safety, Health and Environment manual incorporating 
best practices to prevent accidents. Comprehensive 
review of Technical Proposals submitted by bidders 
and periodic review of construction methodology and 
rolling program by PMC will mitigate risks emanating 
from adoption of improper or obsolete construction 
methods and/or delay in material delivery. 
(xii) inefficient site management due to 
ambiguous specifications, unskilled 
labour, ineffective supervision, 
inadequate experience of contractor, 
lack of control over sub-contractors 
Measures such as appointment of General 
Consultant/Engineering Services Consultant for 
drafting of bid specifications, DBLS contracting 
strategy, bid conditions requiring bidders to submit 
their understanding of bid specifications, experience 
and technical profile of proposed organisation, 
construction methodology and work program as part of 
their Technical Proposals and review of bidders’ 
Technical Proposals, appointment of PMCs and Design 
Review Consultants are aimed at mitigating these risks. 
(xiii) poor site coordination due to lack of 
coordination between site and design 
office, non-availability of 
drawings/designs on time, unrealistic 
time schedule built in the contract 
Suitable provisions such as periodic submission and 
review of drawings/designs by the contractor prior to 
commencement of relevant portion of work, adoption 
of consistent drawing software across all contracts etc. 
aim at reducing these risks. Extensive due diligence by 
DFCC, IR and lending agencies (JICA and World 
Bank) has been carried out to avoid the error of 
committing to unrealistic time schedules. 
(xiv) improper planning in ignoring extreme 
weather conditions which lead to low 
labour productivity and therefore lead to 
errors in time estimation; in planning for 
recruitment of skilled operators for 
specialised equipment; in planning the 
requirement of equipment and their 
utilisation 
Measures such as indicating site climatic conditions in 
the bid documents and preparation of Safety, Health 
and Environment with appropriate penalty/incentive 
mechanism aim at mitigating risks emanating from low 
labour productivity due to extreme weather conditions. 
To address the issue of errors in estimation of 
requirement/deployment of specialised equipment and 
skilled operators for such specialised equipment, bid 
conditions require bidders to include their deployment 
program for construction machinery and specialised 
equipment and required construction organisation as 
part of their Technical Proposals. Comprehensive 
review of bidders’ Technical Proposals and 
appointment of PMCs are likely to help mitigate risks 
arising from errors in estimation of 
requirement/deployment of specialised equipment and 
skilled operators for such specialised equipment. 
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(xv) lack of clarity of project scope resulting 
in rework or scope creep due to 
misunderstanding by the contractor or 
project manager 
Appointment of General Consultants/Engineering 
Consultants, preliminary geotechnical, hydrological, 
seismic and environmental surveys provided, bid 
conditions requiring bidders to carry out their own 
surveys, bid conditions requiring submission of 
bidders’ Technical Proposals incorporating their 
understanding of bid specifications and comprehensive 
review thereof and appointment of Design Review 
Consultants appear to be effective countermeasures. 
(xvi) lack of communication with local 
authorities resulting in delays in 
permissions; lack of communication 
between contractor and client results in 
delay in approval of stages 
DFCC has appointed Chief Project Managers at 
appropriate locations all though the proposed corridors 
to help coordinate communication between contractors 
and local authorities to avoid any delay on such 
account. 
(xvii) substandard contract, selection of 
contractor with inadequate experience or 
skill sets, optimistic cost and time 
duration built in the contract 
Contract conditions require that the contractor shall 
seek prior consent of the Engineer before deployment 
of any subcontractor. Contract conditions also specify 
that the main contractor shall be responsible for acts or 
defaults of any subcontractor. As discussed above, 
adequate safeguards have been envisaged at the 
planning, bidding and execution stages to reduce 
possibility of committing to optimistic cost and time 
duration. 
 
Future research directions 
The magnitude of the DFC project and the number of national and international 
stakeholders involved makes it an ideal candidate for research in a number of areas. A 
few areas that are immediately evident are the evaluation of the mitigation measures 
over the project duration; efficacy of FIDIC contractual methods in Indian public 
sector contracts; study of contract performance of DFC vis-à-vis IR; contractor 
perceptions of efficacy of design-build contracting; supporting consultants’ evaluation 
and selection methodology; efficacy of supporting consultants; and effects of contract 
incentives and disincentives. 
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